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the stock of foreign students is an important predictor of subsequent migration. This holds 
true whether or not the lagged endogenous variable is included. The relationship is robust to 
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results have important policy implications which we discuss in the last section. 
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I. Introduction 
 
The determinants of migration have received a lot of attention in the economics literature, as 
evidenced in the review by Borjas (1994), among others. A consensus view is that both 
economic and cultural forces play an important role. Increased standard of living and the 
employment rate in the destination country tend to stimulate migration, while a higher 
standard of living and growth in the source country reduce push factors for emigration. 
Migration is easier between more similar countries, and especially a shared language plays an 
important role. There is also extensive evidence on the importance of existing networks of 
previous migrants (see Hatton 2003, Mitchell and Pain 2003, Clark et al. 2004 and Pedersen 
et al. 2004). On the positive side, the presence of compatriots eases the arrival of newcomers: 
the expatriate community helps finding jobs and apartments, and provides an existing social 
network. Here, there are decreasing returns to scale: once a critical mass of expatriate 
community is reached, further increases in its size no longer similarly ease further migration. 
On the negative side, large-scale immigration may generate a backlash, thus making 
integration of new migrants more difficult. Due to these counteracting effects, it is usually 
posited that the effects of existing immigrants stocks on the flow of new immigrants are 
initially positive, but that the effects tend to reduce in the size of the immigrant community, 
and may finally turn negative. 
Migration studies have tended to focus on permanent migration, but a lot of migration 
flows are temporary – for example, a large number of students do part of their studies abroad. 
According to Tremblay (2002), the world’s increasing integration leads to rising 
internationalization of educational courses. As a consequence, countries encourage their 
students to study abroad – benefiting from their cost-free education on their return. On the 
other hand, host countries are interested in educating foreign students, partly to attract human 
capital, benefiting the domestic economy. 
In 2002, the number of foreign students in the OECD countries was 1.9 million, being 
on average 5.3 percent of all students in the OECD countries (OECD 2003).
1 These migration 
flows are highly concentrated: 71 percent of foreign students go to the United States, The 
United Kingdom, Germany, France or Australia (Tremblay 2002). The share of foreign 
students in total student population is highest in Switzerland (17 percent), Australia (14 
percent), Austria (12 percent) and the United Kingdom (11 percent). In the United States, the 
                                                 
1 Different countries use different definitions as to who are foreign students. Most European countries use as 
criterion foreign nationality or citizenship, thus including permanent residents and their children. The United 
Kingdom excludes permanent residents. The United States excludes permanent residents and refugees (Tremblay 
2002). For the purpose of our study, the U.S. definition is most relevant.   3
share of foreign students is 3.5 percent. However, 16.6 percent of foreign students in the 
United States are at the advanced research level, making an important contribution to 
American Ph.D. programs (Tremblay 2002). In the OECD countries, the proportion of foreign 
students rose by 30.4 percent between 1995 and 2001. 
An important question is who – in addition, of course, to the student – gains from 
students being educated abroad. Do foreign students significantly increase the amount of 
permanent human capital in the host countries, resulting in brain drain from the countries of 
origin or does the majority of those students return home? The question has important policy 
implications both for the host country and the country of origin. That some of the foreign 
students stay in their country of study is, in fact, well known (Tremblay 2002). According to 
the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (2000), out of a sample of 4200 migrants 
holding temporary permission to work in the United States (H1B visa) 23 percent previously 
held a student visa. Clearly, there are good reasons to expect that the experience of having 
studied in a country considerably eases subsequent migration. In 2000, several OECD 
countries changed their legislation allowing a larger number of foreign students to stay, in 
order to alleviate shortages of skilled labor. In addition to their direct economic contributions, 
the presence of foreign students may also significantly invigorate the academic life of the 
destination country. The destination country might even benefit from economies of scale in 
the education system (Tremblay 2002). 
Although there are some attempts to evaluate how many foreign students stay in the 
country they study in, we are not aware of any empirical research incorporating student flows 
into a more general model explaining permanent migration. As Tremblay (2002: 5) puts it, 
“the scale of this phenomenon is extremely difficult to ascertain” – but this is what our paper 
aims to do. Specifically, we try to fill the gap in the empirical literature on the effects of 
foreign student flows on subsequent migration flows. We take as our starting point previous 
studies estimating migration, most notably, Hatton (2003), Mitchell and Pain (2003), Clark et 
al. (2004) and Pedersen et al. (2004). These studies do not take into account the role of 
student flows. As in these studies, we account for push and pull factors of migration, adding 
the effects of studying in the destination country into the list of pull factors. Our hypothesis is 
that having studied previously in the prospective destination country significantly eases 
migration.  
Due to restrictions concerning data availability, we can only estimate cross-section 
regressions when analyzing worldwide migration. However, there are time series data on 
migration to the United States. Thus, our main focus is on understanding the role of student   4
flows when explaining migration to the United States. In addition to being of great interest in 
its own right, the United States is the largest recipient of international students. This also 
renders the results with the U.S. data more interesting to a wider audience. Understanding the 
reasons behind the success of the United States in attracting skilled migrants is valuable for 
European countries aiming to do the same. To enable comparison, we also present a cross-
section of migration to OECD countries in addition to our panel data analysis on migration to 
the United States. 
Our paper is organized as follows. The next section presents our model. We then 
introduce the data and estimate the relationship between migration and student flows 
empirically. The final section concludes and draws policy implications. 
 
II. The Model 
When choosing where to live and work potential migrants compare both material 
consumption and other aspects of well-being, like social networks. Following Zavodny (1997) 
and Pedersen et al. (2004), we write individual k’s expected utility in country j in year t as 
) , , , ( jkt ikt ijk ijkt ijkt X X D S U U =  (1) 
where Sijkt is a vector of characteristics that affect individual k’s utility of living in country j in 
year t, given that the individual lived in country i in year t-1. This vector includes information 
on individual k’s home country: it is reasonable to assume that most people have a home 
country preference, for example due to the existence of social networks. This vector also 
includes the effects of previous migrants from k’s home country in other countries. In addition 
to the stock of previous migrants, taken into account in the bulk of previous literature, we also 
include in this vector previous student flows from k’s home country to country j.  
Vector D captures migration costs. For example, migration costs tend to be higher if 
the source country is land-locked, as such countries are often less well connected, and do not 
allow sea route connections elsewhere. In our analysis of migration to the United States, we 
also include in D the distance from the source country to the United States, and the percentage 
of source country population that speak English. Note that the stock of previous migrants 
could enter also into migration cost, especially considering psychological costs. We have 
chosen to include it into S as Pedersen et al. (2004), but the results would be the same if it 
were included, instead, in D as we later adopt a linear specification of individual utility. 
  The economic push and pull factors, most notably the GDP per capita ratio between 
the source and the destination country and the ratio of the average schooling between the two, 
are included in the X vectors. In some specifications, we also include here a variable   5
measuring democracy in the source country, as well as GDP growth and unemployment in the 
destination country. 
  We assume individual utility to be linear in the relevant characteristics. Including an 
idiosyncratic error ε, the utility function reads as: 
, 4 3 2 1 ijkt jkt ikt ijk ijkt ijkt X X D S U ε α α α α + + + + =    (2) 
where α1, α2, α3, and α4 are vectors of the parameters of interest that we estimate. When 
choosing where to migrate, an individual picks country j which results in the highest expected 
utility. 
  We estimate below migration in two different frameworks. We first study migration 
flows to nine OECD countries, and then migration flows to the United States. In the first 
specification, the probability of choosing country j among the OECD countries is 
[ ] ) ,..., , max( Pr ) / Pr( 2 1 1 ktnt t kt t ki ijkt kt kt U U U U i j = = − ,   (3) 
where n is the total number of countries. Due to data constraints, we do not have observations 
for all countries, limiting us to a subset of the nine OECD destination countries below. 
  When studying migration flows to the United States, we only compare utility available 
in the United States to that available in the home country. An interpretation here, as well as in 
the analysis of migration to the nine OECD countries, would be that we exclude from the 
analysis those who have decided to migrate elsewhere, and focus only on those choosing 
whether to stay in the home country or migrate to the destination country. For them, migration 
to the United States takes place if 
kiit kiUSAt U U > . 
  In the empirical specification, we normalize migration flows by dividing gross flows 
by the population of the source country. This gives us a model to evaluate migration to the 
nine OECD countries, parallel to Pedersen et al. (2004), 
, 4 3 2 1 ijkt jkt ikt ijk ijkt ijkt X X D S m µ β β β β + + + + =    (4) 
where m is the log of immigrants admitted, relative to source country population, and 
coefficients β are related to but not identical with coefficients α, the same holding for the error 
termµ . The empirical specification for migration to the United States is  
, 4 3 2 1 iUSAkt USAkt ikt iUSAk iUSAkt iUSAkt X X D S m υ γ γ γ γ + + + + =  
with corresponding relationship between the parameters of interest γ and underlying 
parameters in the utility function α. We also estimate the equation 
, 1 4 3 2 1 iUSAkt iUSAkt USAkt ikt iUSAk iUSAkt iUSAkt m X X D S m µ γ γ γ γ + + + + + = −  (5)   6
with the lagged endogenous variable included – thus taking into account that migration 
follows a rather stable pattern over time. 
 
III. Data 
The migration data for our cross-section analysis is taken from the OECD’s (2001) 
International Migration Statistics. Data are provided for 94 origin countries. The destination 
countries covered are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the 
United States. The number of foreign students enrolled by country of citizenship is from the 
OECD’s (2003) Education Database. In most cases foreign students are identified on the basis 
of citizenship, in some, however, other criteria – like place of birth or former domicile – 
apply.
2 
The data for the number of foreign students in the United States is taken from the 
Institute of International Education Network. As a nonimmigrant class of admission, the data 
refer to foreigners coming temporarily to the United States to pursue studies in an institution 
of higher education. Graph 1 shows the regional distribution of where the foreign students in 
the United States came from over the period 1970-2001. As can be seen, there is some 
variation in the composition of source countries over time. Overall, the share of students 
coming from the Middle East decreased from 12 to 7 percent over the last 30 years, with the 
hike during the seventies mainly being due to a surge in the number of Iranian and Saudi 
Arabian students. The share of students coming from Central America and the Caribbean fell 
by almost half from its 13 percent at the beginning of the seventies. The same is true for the 
share of Canadian students, falling from 9 to 5 percent. 
                                                 
2 See Tremblay (2002) for an in-depth discussion and the potential bias arising from this.   7
 
The data for the number of immigrants admitted to the United States is provided by 
the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) Statistical Yearbooks.
3 The data refers 
to all legal immigration, including refugees but does not include foreign students. The data 
employed here classify immigrants according to their birth country and not the country of last 
residence. They refer to both those who applied from abroad and those who changed to 
permanent status while already being in the United States.
4  
Graph 2 shows the regional composition of immigrants to the United States over the 
period 2000-03. As can be seen, the United States has experienced rising immigration since 
the 1970s. The graph shows that the composition of immigrants changed to some extent over 
the last 30 years. Whereas the proportion of immigrants from Europe fell from almost 30 
                                                 
3 We thank Timothy J. Hatton for providing these data. 
4 For a more detailed description of the immigration data see Clark, Hatton and Williamson (2002). 
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percent to well below 15 percent in 2003, the share of those from Asia rose from 20 percent to 
over 30 percent. The share of those from Africa rose from 1 to 7 percent; while the share of 
those from the Middle East, South America, Central America and the Caribbean and Canada 
remained more or less the same. The large increase in the share of immigrants from Central 
America and the Caribbean at the beginning of the nineties is mainly due to a surge in 
Mexican immigration. 
 
Most important for our study, of course, is the relationship between the number of 
foreign students and immigration. In fact, correlation between those two flows is quite high, 
with 0.36 for the OECD sample and 0.67 for the United States (with both variables expressed 
as a share of source country population and in logarithms). We elaborate on this relationship 
in the next sections.  
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IV. Empirical Specification and Results for a cross section of OECD countries 
Our selection of variables follows the analyses of Fertig (2001), Clark, Hatton and 
Williamson (2002) and Hatton (2003). The dependent variable is the log (immigrants 
admitted/source country population) ratio.
5 The source country’s GDP per capita relative to 
per capita GDP in the country of destination is included to capture expected relative 
improvements in the income of immigrants. The lower is per capita GDP in the country of 
origin relative to the destination country, the more attractive is immigration. We also include 
the ratio of average years of schooling in the source country relative to the destination country 
as a proxy for relative human capital stocks. By controlling for the stock of human capital, the 
income variable reflects the relative return on human capital instead of amount and average 
return (Clark, Hatton and Williamson 2002). We expect relative schooling years to have a 
positive impact on migration. The costs of migration depend on whether the source country is 
landlocked. The costs of migration are also assumed to depend on the stock of migrants 
already living in the destination country. The variables ‘stock of migrants’ and ‘stock of 
migrants squared’ capture the combined impact of friends and relatives already living in the 
country, and possible negative responses by the native population.
6 On the positive side, for 
example, a partner having studied abroad might facilitate the other one’s immigration also. 
The host country might give them preference for their linguistic mastery, their familiarity with 
the host country’s social context and the lifting of entry barriers by possessing a degree 
“known” to employers (Tremblay 2002). The negative reactions might include increased 
competition in the labor market, more restrictive immigration policies, and negative sentiment 
towards immigrants and foreigners in general. All variables, their precise definitions and data 
sources are listed in the appendix. 
Table 1 reports the results for a cross section of 36 source countries and 9 host 
countries.
7 Due to missing data, our analysis, however, has only 93 observations. 
Unfortunately, the number of students studying in the OECD countries is only available for 
the period 1998-2000;
8 migration flows, however, are not available after 1995. With this in 
mind, and the number of observations being only 93, the results of the analysis can merely be 
suggestive. 
                                                 
5 Note that population is measured in thousands to obtain smaller coefficients. 
6 Ideally, one would like to control for the stock of previous migrants in specific cities rather than countries and 
relate them to migrant flows to those cities. We do not have the data for this exercise. 
7 Our selection of countries is driven by data availability. The countries included in our sample are listed in 
Appendix C. As we focus on the United States in the next section, we do omit the United States as destination 
country here. 
8 For a detailed description of these data see Tremblay (2002).   10
Table 1: Migration to OECD, (cross section, OLS) 
Explanatory Variables  (1) (2) 
log (foreign students/  0.44  0.45 
    origin population)  (4.90***) (5.05***) 
GDP per capita ratio  -0.85  -0.80 
    (origin/destination)  (2.14**)  (1.70*) 
Schooling years ratio  1.11  1.02 
    (origin/destination)  (1.82*)  (1.70*) 
Landlocked, 0.18   
    dummy  (0.24)   
Immigrant stock/  103.11  30.54 
    origin population  (1.82*)  (1.55) 
Immigrants/ population  2800.37   
   squared  (1.38)   
Number of host countries  9  9 
Number of source countries  36  36 
Number of observations  93  93 
R² 0.29  0.28 
Notes: 
dependent variable: log (immigrants admitted/source country population) 
‘t’-statistics in parentheses: 
***, **, * significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively 
 
As can be seen in column 1, with a coefficient significant at the five percent level, 
migration flows are lower with a higher per capita GDP in the source country relative to the 
country of immigration. At the ten percent level of significance, migration flows are higher 
with a higher ratio of years in school and a higher stock of immigrants already living in the 
destination country. The results also show that student flows and migration are significantly 
related, with a highly significant coefficient. Squared immigration and the dummy for 
landlocked countries do not significantly influence migration. Column 2 thus omits those 
insignificant variables. The result for student flows remains. As the corresponding coefficient 
shows, a one percent increase in student flows is associated with about half a percent increase 
in immigration. 
In the next section we further investigate the issue using data for one country of 
destination only – the United States – for which more extensive data is available. 
   11
V. Empirical Specification and Results for the United States 
This section analyzes migration with the United States as the destination country. As 
data availability is much better for the United States, we can test our hypotheses more 
rigorously using cross-section time-series (panel) data of immigrants from a maximum of 78 
source countries.
9 The annual data cover the years 1971-2001. Since some of the data are not 
available for all countries or years, the panel data are unbalanced and our number of 
observations depends on the choice of explanatory variables. Since there was significant first-
order autocorrelation in all models, the disturbance term is modeled as an AR(1) process.  
Again, the dependent variable is the log (immigrants admitted/source country 
population) ratio. In addition to the variables of Table 1, we include the distance from the 
source country to the United States and the percentage of source country population that 
speak English. The costs of migration rise with distance from the United States. They are 
lower for English speaking people.
10 
Column 1 of Table 2 shows the results (of our random effects estimator). As can be 
seen, all coefficients are significant at the five percent level at least. In line with our 
hypotheses, the number of migrants to the United States rises with lower relative GDP and 
relatively longer education. More immigrants come from countries that are geographically 
closer to the United States, have a higher share of native English speakers, and have access to 
the sea.
11 The stock of immigrants already living in the United States initially attracts more 
people from the same country. However, as indicated by the negative coefficient of the 
squared stock variable, this impact reverses eventually. The results also show that 
immigration from a specific country is more likely, the more students from that country 
studied in the United States in the previous year. The coefficient of this variable is significant 
at the one percent level and is quantitatively important. According to the estimate of column 
1, a ten percent increase in student flows leads to approximately one percent more 
immigration. For comparison, an increase in relative income by 10 percent reduces 
immigration by slightly more than 5 percent, and an increase in relative years of schooling by 
the same percentage increases immigration on average by almost 10 percent. A hundred mile 
                                                 
9 Our selection of countries is again driven by data availability. The countries included in our sample are listed in 
Appendix C. 
10 We did not include these variables in the cross country regressions of the previous section as we do not have 
the data for all countries in the sample. 
11 As distance from the United States and the dummy for landlocked countries both measure travel costs, we also 
included them in the regression one at a time. The results are unchanged.   12
increase in the distance between the origin country and the United States reduces immigration 
by 4 percent.
12 
Table 2: Migration to the United States, (1971-2001, OLS AR1) 
Explanatory Variables  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) 
log (foreign students/  0.09  0.04  0.03  0.04 
    origin population), t-1  (4.79***)  (6.47***)  (1.87*)  (3.46***) 
GDP per capita ratio  -0.53  -0.07  -0.17  -0.21 
    (origin/U.S.)  (3.23***)  (3.18***)  (0.64)  (2.07**) 
Schooling years ratio  0.92  0.002  -0.67  -0.02 
    (origin/U.S.)  (2.88***)  (0.04)  (1.09)  (0.12) 
Distance from U.S.  -0.0004  -9.25e-06     
 (8.18***)  (2.64***)     
Landlocked, -1.05  -0.004     
    Dummy  (3.52***)  (0.17)     
English speaking  0.01  0.0004     
    (percent of population)  (2.61***)  (1.29)     
Immigrant stock (t-1)/  12.12  1.51  0.30  1.30 
    origin population (t-1)  (4.82***)  (2.67***)  (0.09)  (1.65*) 
Immigrants/ population (t-1)  -29.25  -5.20  -3.36  -4.46 
   Squared  (3.92***)  (2.17**)  (0.41)  (1.79*) 
Lagged Endogenous     0.94    0.83 
    Variable    (140.99***)    (64.30***) 
Number of countries  78  78  78  78 
Number of observations  1903  1881  1825  1803 
Country/ Year dummies  No  No  Yes  Yes 
R² (overall)  0.57  0.98  0.04  0.98 
Notes: 
dependent variable: log (immigrants admitted/source country population)  
‘t’-statistics in parentheses: 
***, **, * significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively 
 
 
In column 2, we add the lagged endogenous variable. As a consequence, the estimated 
impact of students on migration becomes quantitatively smaller, with a ten percent increase in 
student flows leading to about half a percent more immigration. The coefficient stays, 
                                                 
12 If we drop the share of English speaking population and distance from the U.S. (and so exactly replicate the 
specification of Table 1), the results are unchanged. We also included the squared distance to test for non-
linearities. Indeed, the squared term is significant at the one percent level, with a positive coefficient. The 
coefficient of the share of English speaking population is no longer significant, while all other results remain.   13
however, significant at the one percent level. The lagged dependent variable is highly 
significant and the share of the dependent variables’ variation explained by the regression 
rises substantially. With the inclusion of the lagged endogenous variable, relative schooling 
years no longer significantly affect immigration. The dummy for landlocked countries also 
loses its significance as does the percent of the population speaking English. 
As a hausman test rejects the random effects model in favor of fixed effects and we 
found significant period effects in all specifications, columns 3 and 4 replicate the analysis 
including those dummies.
13 As a consequence, we cannot employ variables that do not vary 
over time or across countries. Language, distance, and the share of population speaking 
English have to be omitted. The results show that most coefficients are insignificant when 
time and country dummies are included. Most important for our analysis, however, the 
coefficient of student flows stays significant at least at the ten percent level when the lagged 
endogenous variable is excluded and at the one percent level otherwise. 
In order to further investigate the relationship between immigration and foreign 
students, Table 3 includes up to three lags of the foreign students variable in the regressions. 
Arguably, students are more likely to immigrate permanently to the United States at the end 
of their studies. Unfortunately, we do not have the data to test this hypothesis. The results 
show that the number of students studying in the United States in the previous year always 
increases immigration, while the coefficient of the second lag is only significant with the 
lagged dependent variable included. The third lag is insignificant regardless of the inclusion 
of the lagged endogenous variable. We also included the lags one at a time instead of in 
addition (not reported in the table). When only the third lag is included, its coefficient is 
insignificant when the lagged endogenous variable is excluded, and significant at the five 
percent level otherwise. The same is true for the second lag. Clearly, we have problems with 
collinearity here, so the results have to be interpreted with caution. 
In the next section, we further test the robustness of our results. 
 
                                                 
13 The coefficients of the country and time dummies are not reported in the tables.   14
Table 3: Migration to the United States (1971-2001, OLS AR1) 
Explanatory Variables  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) 
log (foreign students/  0.04  0.06  0.04  0.06 
    origin population), t-1  (2.37**)  (3.23***)  (2.30**)  (3.32***) 
log (foreign students/  -0.001  0.05  0.01  0.06 
    origin population), t-2  (0.07)  (2.55**)  (0.31)  (3.22***) 
log (foreign students/      -0.01  0.02 
    origin population), t-3      (0.55)  (0.85) 
GDP per capita ratio  -0.19  -0.14  -0.18  -0.17 
    (origin/ U.S.)  (1.82*)  (0.51)  (1.56)  (0.59) 
Schooling years ratio  -0.04  0.75  -0.02  -0.76 
    (origin/ U.S.)  (0.28)  (1.13)  (0.09)  (1.12) 
Immigrant stock (t-1)/  1.18  -0.07  1.32  0.07 
    origin population (t-1)  (1.55)  (0.02)  (1.53)  (0.32) 
Immigrants/ population (t-1)  -4.34  -2.14  -4.67  -2.60 
   Squared  (1.69*)  (0.90)  (1.76*)  (0.32) 
Lagged Endogenous   0.82    0.81   
    Variable  (60.95***)    (56.96***)   
Number of countries  78  78  78  78 
Number of observations  1753  1754  1682  1683 
Country/ Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R² (overall)  0.98  0.13  0.98  0.18 
Notes: 
dependent variable: log (immigrants admitted/source country population) 
‘t’-statistics in parentheses: 
***, **, * significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively 
 
VI. Further Discussion 
This section tests the robustness of our results with respect to inclusion of additional 
explanatory variables and in terms of the observations included in the regressions. First, 
regarding additional variables, we follow the previous literature to identify candidate 
variables. Mitchell and Pain (2003) suggest including the unemployment rate and economic 
growth in the United States. Arguably, people are more likely trying to escape countries 
where political participation is weak. We therefore also include a variable measuring whether 
or not the source country is a democracy. 
When it comes to how helpful previous immigrants are in finding a job or apartment, it 
might be the absolute number of immigrants that matters or migrants relative to the   15
population in the destination rather than the origin country. The same is true for backlash 
against immigrants. We therefore replace the number of immigrants relative to source country 
population by their number relative to U.S. population. 
Second, and equally important, we focus on the role of outliers. Some authors suggest 
using so-called robust estimation techniques to deal with them. Robust estimators can be 
thought of as trying to identify that part of the data best approximated by the model being 
estimated (see de Haan and Sturm 2003 for an illustrative discussion). We therefore employ 
the Least Median of Squares (LMS) estimator introduced by Rousseeuw (1984) to test the 
robustness of our results, minimizing the median of the squared residuals. This estimator will 
not be influenced by observations lying outside the typical relationship between the dependent 
and explanatory variables revealed by the remaining data. 
Table 4 contains the results. In column 1, we include the POLITY IV measure of 
democracy. Column 2 includes the rate of unemployment in the United States, column 3 GDP 
growth. In column 4, the stock of migrants in the United States is divided by U.S. population 
instead of origin country population. The same is true for the stock of migrants squared. As 
the table shows, only the unemployment rate is significantly associated with immigration to 
the United States. As expected, immigration is lower with higher unemployment. Dividing the 
stock of migrants by U.S. population rather than origin country population does not change 
the results. The inclusion of the additional variables has no impact on the relationship between 
foreign student enrollment and immigration. In all four regressions immigration is increasing 
in the number of foreign students in the previous year, with a coefficient significant at the one 
percent level. 
In column 5 we report the results of the Least Median of Squares regression. As can be 
seen, the previous results have not been driven by outliers. All coefficients are significant at 
the one percent level and have the expected sign. In the robust regression, the magnitude of 
foreign student enrollment corresponds closely to the results of the cross section for the 
OECD, indicating that a one percent increase in student flows is associated with about half a 
percent increase in immigration. As we cannot control for fixed country effects in both the 
cross section and the LMS regressions, these larger effect most likely represents the pure 
between-country variation. 
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Table 4: Migration to the United States (1971-2001) 
Explanatory Variables  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
log  (foreign  students/  0.08  0.09 0.09 0.09 0.49 
    origin population), t-1  (3.94***)  (4.86***)  (4.81***)  (4.47***)  (23.74***) 
GDP per capita ratio  -0.52  -0.54  -0.53  -0.55  -1.35 
    (origin/ U.S.)  (3.07***)  (3.28***)  (3.22***)  (3.15***)  (18.26***) 
Schooling years ratio  0.62  0.89  0.93  0.94  1.54 
    (origin/ U.S.)  (1.84*)  (2.76***)  (2.89***)  (2.77***)  (10.70***) 
Distance from U.S.  -0.0004  -0.0004  -0.0004  -0.0004  -0.0002 
  (8.29***)  (8.17***) (8.18***) (7.98***) (15.88***) 
Landlocked,  -0.98  -1.05 -1.05 -1.07 -0.27 
    Dummy  (3.24***)  (3.52***)  (3.52***)  (3.06***)  (3.45***) 
English  speaking  0.01  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.004 
    (percent of population)  (2.87***)  (2.64***)  (2.61***)  (2.74***)  (3.82***) 
Immigrant stock (t-1)/  11.59  12.09  12.03    41.42 
    origin population (t-1)  (4.05***)  (4.80***)  (4.77***)    (22.15***) 
Immigrants/ population (t-1)  -24.71  -29.36  -28.99    -175.96 
   Squared  (2.95***)  (3.93***)  (3.88***)    (20.77***) 
Democracy  -0.004      
  (0.59)      
U.S. unemployment rate (t-1)    -0.02       
   (2.91***)       
U.S. GDP growth (t-1)      0.002     
     (0.86)    
Immigrant stock (t-1)/        104.04   
    U.S. population (t-1)        (2.07**)   
Immigrants/ U.S. population         -2936.71   
   (t-1), squared        (1.83*)   
Number of countries  75  78  78  78  78 
Number of observations  1723  1903  1903  1903  1903 
Country/ Year dummies  No  No  No  No  No 









R²  (overall)  0.57  0.57 0.57 0.49 0.53 
Notes: 
dependent variable: log (immigrants admitted/source country population)  
‘t’-statistics in parentheses: 
***, **, * significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively   17
VII. Conclusion 
In this paper, we discover a close link between student flows and migration flows. In 
our cross-section analysis of migration to nine OECD countries, we found that the share of 
foreign students was highly significant. In our panel (OLS) regressions for the United States, 
a ten percent increase in student flows leads to an increase in immigration of between 0.3-0.9 
percent. Clearly, we cannot be sure whether it is the students actually staying in their host 
country or the impact of other student-related factors driving those results. As one example, 
students may tell others about their experiences and have networks that other migrants may 
use.  
Student flows explain migration more consistently in different specifications than 
traditionally highlighted economic variables - like the GDP per capita ratio between the 
country of origin and the United States and the schooling years ratio between the two. When 
country and time dummies are included, the stock of students also generally retains its 
significance, and seems to be a more robust predictor than the stock of previous immigrants or 
its square. When measures of the percentage of English-speaking population, democracy in 
the source country, the unemployment rate, or GDP growth in the United States are included, 
both the stock of foreign students and that of previous immigrants and its square are 
significant at the one percent level. 
One potential problem in explaining migration arises from the omitted variable bias. It 
is conceivable that both student flows and migration flows would reflect an underlying 
cultural and economic proximity, not captured by distance or sharing the English language 
when explaining migration to the United States. To reduce the impact of this possibility, we 
also include the lagged endogenous variable - migration in the previous year - to our panel 
analysis. Indeed, the lagged endogenous variable turns out to be the most powerful 
explanatory variable of current migration. Importantly, the past stock of foreign students still 
retains its significance in all cases. Repeating the analysis using the Least Median of Squares 
estimator suggests that the results are not driven by outliers. 
Our findings have several policy implications for both origin and host countries of 
foreign students. In our OLS regressions for the United States, a ten percent increase in 
student flows leads to an increase in immigration of between 0.3-0.9 percent. This suggests 
that hosting foreign students is an efficient way of attracting future migration, independent of 
the previous immigrant stock. Therefore, European countries aiming to attract immigrants 
from developing countries might benefit from educating students from these countries. 
Governments would then be well advised to take this into account when considering tuition   18
fees for foreign students. The trade-off arising from the fees is the following. On the benefit 
side, charging tuition fees gives additional resources to the host country, and such resources 
could be used to improve the financing of universities. On the cost side, tuition may 
discourage students from entering, either due to liquidity constraints or risk aversion. This 
would then also pre-empt potential gains from future immigration.  
From the perspective of origin countries, sending students abroad involves both brain 
exchange and brain drain. That part of the students remaining abroad, or later emigrating, is a 
cost these countries encounter in order to upgrade the human capital of their youth. However, 
emigrants may also serve as a source of remittances and investments to their home country, 
thanks to significantly higher productivity of labor in destination countries, as well as 
establishing academic and business networks. Given this and population aging in destination 
countries with labor often being abundant in source countries, international student flows may 
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions and Sources 
Cross Section (OECD countries) 
Variable Source  Definition 
Migration to the OECD  OECD (2001)  All  legal  immigrants  admitted, 
including refugees. Data is by 
country of origin. Data are for 1995. 
Foreign students  OECD (2003)  All  foreign  students  enrolled  in 
tertiary education. Data are for the 
year 2000. 
GDP per capita ratio   World Bank 
(2003) 
Gross domestic product divided by 
midyear population. Data are in 
constant U.S. dollars. The value for 
the origin country is divided by 
those for the U.S. 
Schooling years ratio   Barro and Lee 
(2000) 
Average schooling years in the total 
population aged 25+. The value for 
the origin country is divided by 
those for the U.S. Linearly 
interpolated when missing. 
Landlocked, dummy  Easterly and 
Sewadeh (2002) 
Dummy equals one if country has no 
direct access to the sea, zero 
otherwise. 
Immigrant stock  OECD (2001)  Number of foreign born immigrants. 
Data are for 1995. 
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Appendix A (continued) 
Panel (United States) 
Variable Source  Definition 
Migration to the U.S.  Clark et al. (2002)  All  legal  immigrants  admitted, 
including refugees. Includes 
immigrants who applied from abroad 
and those who are already in the 
United States but change to 
permanent status. Data is by country 
of origin. 
Foreign students  Institute of International 
Education, various years. 
A non-immigrant class of admission. 
Someone coming temporarily to the 
United States to pursue a full course 
of study in an approved program in 
either an academic (college, 
university, seminary, conservatory, 
academic high school, elementary 
school, other institution, or language 
training program) or a vocational or 
other recognized non-academic 
institution. 
GDP per capita ratio   World Bank (2003)  Gross  domestic  product  divided  by 
midyear population. Data are in 
constant U.S. dollars. The value for 
the origin country is divided by 
those for the United States. 
Schooling years ratio   Barro and Lee (2000)  Average schooling years in the total 
population aged 25+. The value for 
the origin country is divided by 
those for the United States. Linearly 
interpolated when missing. 
Distance from the U.S.  Hufbauer et al. (2003)  Distance  between  capitals  in  miles. 
Updated with data received from 
Howard J. Wall. 
Landlocked, dummy  Easterly and Sewadeh 
(2002) 
Dummy equals one if country has no 
direct access to the sea, zero 
otherwise. 
English speaking (percent of 
population) 
Alesina et al. (2003)  Percent of population that is English 
speaking. Data refers to 2001. 
Immigrant stock  U.S. Census Bureau, 
various years, and Gibson 
and Lennon (1999) 
Number of foreign born immigrants. 
Linearly interpolated when missing.   22
Appendix A (continued) 
Variable Source  Definition 
Population World  Bank 
(2003) 
Total number of residents in thousands 
regardless of legal status or citizenship 
– except for refugees not permanently 
settled in the country of asylum. 
Democracy  Marshal and 
Jaggers (2000) 
0-10 (0 = low; 10 = high) democracy 
score. Measures the general openness 
of political institutions. 
U.S. unemployment rate  World Bank 
(2003) 
The share of the labor force that is 
without work but available for and 
seeking employment. 
U.S. GDP growth  World Bank 
(2003) 
Annual percentage growth rate of GDP 
at market prices based on constant local 
currency. 
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Appendix B: 
Descriptive Statistics (Cross Section, Estimation Sample) 
Variable Min  Max  Mean  Std.  Dev. 
(overall) 
log (immigrants admitted to 
U.S./ origin population) 
-20.70 -13.63 -15.99 1.21 
log (foreign students/ origin 
population) 
-18.66 -6.95  -10.84 1.96 
GDP per capita ratio 
(origin/destination) 
0.01 2.01 0.56 0.43 
Schooling years ratio 
(origin/destination) 
0.21 1.40 0.83 0.27 
Landlocked, dummy  0  1  0.02  0.16 
Immigrant stock/ origin 
population 
2.61e-06 0.03  0.003  0.01 
Descriptive Statistics (Panel, Estimation Sample) 
Variable Min  Max  Mean  Std.  Dev. 
(overall) 
log (immigrants admitted to 
U.S./ origin population) 
-14.34 -4.14  -8.59  1.76 
log (foreign students/ origin 
population) 
-17.48 -5.66  -9.01  1.31 
GDP per capita ratio (origin/ 
U.S.) 
0.007 2.27  0.39  0.45 
Schooling years ratio (origin/ 
U.S.) 
0.006 1.10  0.49  0.24 
Distance from U.S.  988.32  9683.95  4859.76  2245.17 
Landlocked, dummy  0  1  0.09  0.29 
English speaking (percent of 
population) 
0 97.29  8.67  25.27 
Immigrant stock/ origin 
population 
0.00008 0.34  0.019  0.03 
Immigrant stock/ U.S. 
population 
1.36e-06 0.028  0.0009  0.002 
Democracy 0  10  5.91  4.27 
U.S. unemployment rate  4.2  9.7  6.50  1.32 
U.S. GDP growth  -2.07  7.28  3.20  2.20   24
Appendix C: Country List 
Cross Section (Immigration to OECD) 
Countries of Origin  Destination Countries 
Algeria Greece  Peru    Belgium                           
Australia Hungary  Philippines    Denmark                          
Austria Iceland  Poland    Germany                          
Bangladesh India  Portugal   Japan 
Belgium Iraq  Romania   Netherlands 
Brazil Italy  Somalia   Norway   
Bulgaria Jamaica  Spain   Sweden 
Canada Japan  Sri  Lanka   Switzerland 
Chile Lebanon  Sweden   United  Kingdom 
China Malaysia  Thailand    
Croatia Morocco  Tunisia    







Finland Norway United  States    
France Pakistan  Vietnam    
Germany       
 
Panel (Immigration to the United States) 
Algeria  El Salvador  Japan  Sierra Leone 
Argentina Fiji  Jordan  Singapore 
Australia Finland  Kenya South  Africa 
Austria France Kuwait  Spain 
Bangladesh Germany  Liberia  Sri  Lanka 
Barbados Ghana  Malaysia  Sudan 
Belgium Greece  Malta  Sweden 
Bolivia Guatemala  Mexico  Switzerland 
Brazil Guyana  Nepal  Syria 
Cameroon  Haiti  Netherlands  Trinidad and Tobago 
Canada Honduras  New  Zealand  Tunisia 
Chile Hong  Kong  Nicaragua  Turkey 
China, People's Rep.  Hungary  Norway  United Arab Emirates
Colombia Iceland  Pakistan  United  Kingdom 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  India  Panama  Zambia 
Costa Rica  Indonesia  Paraguay  Zimbabwe 
Cyprus Iran  Peru  
Denmark Ireland  Philippines   
Dominican Republic  Israel  Poland   
Ecuador Italy  Portugal   
Egypt Jamaica  Senegal   
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